1. A Minnesota statute declares that one who engages "in the business of regularly and customarily producing, publishing," etc., "a malicious, scandalous and
defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical," is guilty of a nuisance, and authorizes suits, in the name of the State, in which such periodicals may be
abated and their publishers enjoined from future violations. In such a suit, malice may be inferred from the fact of publication. The defendant is permitted to
prove, as a defense, that his publications were true and published "with good motives and for justifiable ends." Disobedience of an injunction is punishable as a
contempt. Held unconstitutional, as applied to publications charging neglect of duty and corruption upon the part of law-enforcing officers of the State. Pp. 704 ,
709 , 712 , 722 . 2. Liberty of the press is within the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action.
P. 707 . 3. Liberty of the press is not an absolute right, and the State may punish its abuse. P. 708 . 4. In passing upon the constitutionality of the statute, the
court has regard for substance, and not for form; the statute must be tested by its operation and effect. P. 708 . [p*698] 5. Cutting through mere details of
procedure, the operation and effect of the statute is that public authorities may bring a publisher before a judge upon a charge of conducting a business of
publishing scandalous and defamatory matter -- in particular, that the matter consists of charges against public officials of official dereliction -- and, unless the
publisher is able and disposed to satisfy the judge that the charges are true and are published with good motives and for justifiable ends, his newspaper or
periodical is suppressed and further publication is made punishable as a contempt. This is the essence of censorship. P. 713 . 6. A statute authorizing such
proceedings in restraint of publication is inconsistent with the conception of the liberty of the press as historically conceived and guaranteed. P. 713 . 7. The chief
purpose of the guaranty is to prevent previous restraints upon publication. The libeler, however, remains criminally and civilly responsible for his libels. P. 713 . 8.
There are undoubtedly limitations upon the immunity from previous restraint of the press, but they are not applicable in this case. P. 715 . 9. The liberty of the
press has been especially cherished in this country as respects publications censuring public officials and charging official misconduct. P. 716 . 10. Public officers
find their remedies for false accusations in actions for redress and punishment under the libel laws, and not in proceedings to restrain the publication of
newspapers and periodicals. P. 718 . 11. The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal does not make any the less
necessary the immunity from previous restraint in dealing with official misconduct. P. 720 . 12. Characterizing the publication of charges of official misconduct as
a "business," and the business as a nuisance, does not avoid the constitutional guaranty; nor does it matter that the periodical is largely or chiefly devoted to such
charges. P. 720 . 13. The guaranty against previous restraint extends to publications charging official derelictions that amount to crimes. P. 720 . 14. Permitting
the publisher to show in defense that the matter published is true and is published with good motives and for justifiable ends does not justify the statute. P. 721 .
15. Nor can it be sustained as a measure for preserving the public peace and preventing assaults and crime. Pp. 721 , 722 . 179 Minn. 40; 228 N.W. 326,
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