Appellants, faculty members of the State University of New York and a non-faculty employee, brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming
that New York's teacher loyalty laws and regulations are unconstitutional. Their continued employment had been terminated or was threatened when each
appellant faculty member refused to comply with a requirement of the University trustees that he certify that he was not a Communist and that, if he had ever
been one, he had so advised the university president, and the non-faculty employee refused to state under oath whether he had advocated or been a member of
a group which advocated forceful overthrow of the government. Under § 3021 of New York's Education Law, "treasonable or seditious" utterances or acts are
grounds for dismissal from the public school system, as well as under § 105, subd. 3, of the Civil Service Law. Other provisions of § 105 of the Civil Service
Law disqualify from the civil service or employment in the educational system any person advocating or involved with the distribution of written material which
advocates the forceful overthrow of the government. Section 3021 does not define "treasonable or seditious." Section 105, subd. 3, provides that "treasonable
word or act" shall mean "treason" as defined in the Penal Law, and "seditious word or act" shall mean "criminal anarchy" as therein defined. Section 3022 (the
Feinberg Law) of the Education Law requires the State Board of Regents to issue regulations for the disqualification or removal on loyalty grounds of faculty or
other personnel in the state educational system, to make a list of "subversive" organizations, and to provide that membership therein constitutes prima facie
evidence of disqualification for employment. The Board listed the National and State Communist Parties as "subversive organizations" under the law, but, shortly
before the trial of this case, the university trustees' certificate requirement was rescinded and it was announced that no person would be ineligible for employment
"solely" because he refused to sign the [p*590] certificate, and that §§ 3021 and 3022 of the Education Law and § 105 of the Civil Service Law constituted part
of the employment contract. A three-judge District Court sustained the constitutionality of these provisions against appellants' challenges of vagueness and
overbreadth and dismissed the complaint. Held: 1. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 , in which this Court upheld some aspects of the New York
teacher loyalty plan before its extension to state institutions of higher learning, is not controlling, the vagueness issue presented here involving § 3021 and § 105
not having been decided in Adler, and the validity of the subversive organization membership provision of § 3022 having been upheld for reasons subsequently
rejected by this Court. Pp. 593-595 . 2. The rescission of the certificate requirement does not moot this case, as the substance of the statutory and regulatory
complex challenged by appellants remains. P. 596 . 3. Section 3021 of the Education Law and § 105, subds. 1(a), 1(b), and 3, of the Civil Service Law, as
implemented by the machinery created pursuant to § 3022 of the Education Law, are unconstitutionally vague, since no teacher can know from § 3021 of the
Education Law and § 105, subd. 3, of the Civil Service Law what constitutes the boundary between "seditious" and nonseditious utterances and acts, and the
other provisions may well prohibit the employment of one who advocates doctrine abstractly, without any attempt to incite others to action, and may be
construed to cover mere expression of belief. Pp. 597-604 . (a) These provisions, which have not been interpreted by the New York courts, can have a stifling
effect on the "free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice" (Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (concurring opinion)).
Pp. 601-602 . (b) Academic freedom is a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom. P. 603 . (c) The prolixity and profusion of statutes, regulations, and administrative machinery, and manifold cross-references to interrelated
enactments and rules aggravate the problem of vagueness of wording. P. 604 . 4. The provisions of the Civil Service Law (§ 105, subd. 1(c)) and the Education
Law (§ 3022, subd. 2) which make Communist Party membership, as such, prima facie evidence of disqualification [p*591] for employment in the public school
system are "overbroad," and therefore unconstitutional. Pp. 605-610 . (a) Constitutional doctrine after this Court's upholding of § 3022, subd. 2, in Adler has
rejected its major premise that public employment may be conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct
government action. P. 605 . (b) Mere knowing membership, without a specific intent to further the unlawful aims of an organization, is not a constitutionally
adequate basis for imposing sanctions. Pp. 606-610 . 255 F.Supp. 981, reversed and remanded.
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