In No. 37, respondent brought a diversity libel action in federal court seeking compensatory and punitive damages for an article which was published in
petitioner's magazine accusing respondent of conspiring to "fix" a football game between the University of Alabama and the University of Georgia, where he was
privately employed as the athletic director. The article was based upon an affidavit concerning a telephone conversation between respondent and the Alabama
coach which the affiant, Burnett, had accidentally overheard. Respondent challenged the truth of the article and claimed a serious departure by the magazine from
good investigative standards of the accuracy of its charges amounting to reckless and wanton conduct. He submitted evidence at the trial showing, inter alia, that
petitioner's magazine, which had instituted a policy of "sophisticated muckraking," knew that Burnett was on criminal probation but had published the story
without any independent support for his affidavit; that it did not, before publication, view his notes (the information in which, if not valueless, would be readily
available to any coach); that the magazine did not interview a person with Burnett when the phone call was overheard, view the game films, or check for any
adjustments in Alabama's plans after the information was divulged, and that the magazine assigned the story to a writer not a football expert and made no effort
to have such an expert check the story. The jury was instructed on the issue of truth as a defense and was also instructed that it could award punitive damages
and could assess the reliability and the nature of the sources of the magazine's information and its care in checking the assertions, considerations relevant tn
determining whether the magazine had proceeded with "wanton and reckless indifference." The jury returned a verdict of general and punitive damages which
was reduced by remittitur. The trial court rejected the defense's new trial motion based on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (which was decided
after the filing of the complaint in and trial of this case), holding that decision [p*131] inapplicable to one like petitioner not a public official. It also held the
evidence amply supported the conclusion that the magazine had acted in reckless disregard of whether the article was false or not. The Court of Appeals
affirmed on the merits. It did not reach the constitutional claim based on New York Times, holding that petitioner had waived the right to make that challenge,
since some of its lawyers had been involved in the latter case, yet the defense was based solely on the issue of truth. In No. 150, petitioner, a news association,
published a dispatch about a massive riot on the University of Mississippi campus attending federal efforts to enforce a court decree ordering a Negro's
enrollment. The dispatch stated that respondent, a politically prominent figure whose statements on federal intervention had been widely publicized, had taken
command of the violent crowd and led a charge against federal marshals trying to enforce the court's decree, had encouraged violence and given technical advice
to the rioters. Respondent brought a libel action in the Texas state courts for compensatory and punitive damages. Petitioner's defense was based on truth and
constitutional rights. The evidence showed that the dispatch had been made on the scene and almost immediately reported to the petitioner by a competent
correspondent. There was no significant showing of improper preparation of the dispatch, or any prejudice by petitioner or its correspondent. The jury was
instructed that compensatory damages could be awarded if the dispatch was not substantially true and that punitive damages could be added if the article was
actuated by ill will or entire want of care. The jury returned a verdict for both compensatory and punitive damages. The trial court refused to enter an award for
the latter. The court held New York Times inapplicable, but that, if applicable, it would require a verdict for the petitioner, since there was no evidence of malice.
Both sides appealed. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, and the Texas Supreme Court denied review. Held: The judgment in No. 37 is affirmed. The
judgment in No. 150 is reversed, and the case remanded. Pp. 133-174 . No. 37, 351 F.2d 702, affirmed; No. 150, 393 S.W.2d 671, reversed and remanded.
Opinions MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, joined by MR. JUSTICE CLARK, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR. .JUSTICE FORTAS, concluded that: 1.
Petitioner's failure in No. 37 to raise the constitutional defense before trial constituted no waiver of its right to do so after New York Times was decided. Pp.
142-145 . [p*132] 2. The New York Times rule prohibiting a public official from recovering damages for defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
absent actual malice as therein defined, though necessary there to protect against prosecutions close to seditious libel for criticizing official conduct, should not be
inexorably applied to defamation actions by "public figures" like those here, where different considerations are present. Pp. 148 , 152-154 . 3. A "public figure"
who is not a public official may recover damages for defamatory falsehood substantially endangering his reputation on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct
constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers. P. 155 . 4. In view of the
court's instructions in No. 37, the jury must have decided that the magazine's investigation was grossly inadequate, and the evidence amply supported a finding of
the highly unreasonable conduct referred to above. Pp. 156-158 . 5. In No. 150, where the courts found the evidence insufficient to support more than a finding
of even ordinary negligence, respondent is not entitled to damages. Pp. 158-159 . 6. Misconduct sufficient to justify compensatory damages also justifies punitive
damages; the same constitutional standards apply to both. Pp. 159-161 . THE CHIEF JUSTICE concluded that: 1. The New York Times standard applies to
defamation actions by "public figures" as well as those by "public officials." Pp. 162-165 . 2. The judgment in No. 150, being in clear conflict with New York
Times, must be reversed. P. 165 . 3. Retrial of No. 37 is not necessary, since the jury's verdict therein, in view of instructions which invoked the elements later
held necessary in New York Times, most probably was based on the requirement of reckless disregard for the truth enunciated in that case. Pp. 165-167 . 4.
The overlapping of counsel in No. 37 with counsel in New York Times and in a libel action against petitioner by the Alabama coach, in which a First
Amendment defense was also made, compels the conclusion that the failure to defend on those grounds here was deliberate. Pp. 167-168 . 5. The evidence
shows that petitioner in No. 37 acted in reckless disregard for the truth. Pp. 168-170 . [p*133] MR. JUSTICE BLACK, joined by MR. JUSTICE
DOUGLAS, concluded that, in order to dispose of No. 150, he concurs in the grounds stated by THE CHIEF JUSTICE which are summarized in paragraphs 1
and 2, supra, of THE CHIEF JUSTICES conclusions, but does not recede from his previously expressed views about the much wider press and speech
freedoms of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. P. 170 .
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