Provisions of the New York Education Law which forbid the commercial showing of any motion picture film without a license and authorize denial of a license on
a censor's conclusion that a film is "sacrilegious," held void as a prior restraint on freedom of speech and of the press under the First Amendment, made
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 497-506 . 1. Expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free
press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 499-502 . (a) It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium for the
communication of ideas. Their importance as an organ of public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform. P. 501
. (b) That the production, distribution and exhibition of motion pictures is a large-scale business conducted for private profit does not prevent motion pictures
from being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment. Pp. 501-502 . (c) Even if it be assumed that motion pictures possess a
greater capacity for evil, particularly among the youth of a community, than other modes of expression, it does not follow that they are not entitled to the
protection of the First Amendment or may be subjected to substantially unbridled censorship. P. 502 . (d) To the extent that language in the opinion in Mutual
Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, is out of harmony with the views here set forth, it is no longer adhered to. P. 502 . 2. Under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, a state may not place a prior restraint on the showing of a motion picture film on the basis of a censor's conclusion that it is
"sacrilegious." Pp. 502-506 . (a) Though the Constitution does not require absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all
places, there is no justification in this case for making an [p*496] exception to the basic principles of freedom of expression previously announced by this Court
with respect to other forms of expression. Pp. 502-503 . (b) Such a prior restraint as that involved here is a form of infringement upon freedom of expression to
be especially condemned. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 . Pp. 503-504 . (c) New York cannot vest in a censor such unlimited restraining control over
motion pictures as that involved in the broad requirement that they not be "sacrilegious." Pp. 504-505 . (d) From the standpoint of freedom of speech and the
press, a state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior restraints upon the
expression of those views. P. 505 . 303 N.Y. 242, 101 N.E.2d 665, reversed.
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